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Abstract 
 
As a new nation, Timor-Leste offers a unique case where formal industrial relations 
mechanisms have been developed as part of a broader project of state formation. In other 
words, the transformation of employment relations in the formal sector has taken place as 
part of regime establishment rather than regime change, as has been the case in other post-
authoritarian contexts in Southeast Asia. As this first account of industrial relations in Timor-
Leste demonstrates, the state has been concerned first and foremost with encouraging 
sustainable forms of accumulation, and the employment opportunities that accompany them, 
rather than with regulating labour relations. Although it has responded to pressure from 
international organisations to establish what could have been best-practice industrial relations 
institutions in the country’s tiny formal sector, these efforts have foundered as a consequence 
of a failure to secure employer buy-in and weak enforcement. 
Keywords: Comparative industrial relations, employer’s associations, institutions, 
international trade unionism, political science, social change 
Introduction  
There are few cases in the 21st century where states have had the opportunity to build a 
formal system of industrial relations from the ground up. Timor-Leste is one such case. The 
sharp break from the institutional legacies of the Indonesian Occupation (1975–1999) 
provided a blank canvas for the East Timorese political elite and their international advisors, 
opening up space for the imagining of an entirely new approach not only to employment 
relations but to state building. The formal mechanisms of industrial relations in Timor-Leste 
have thus developed during what Leach and Kingsbury (2013: 2) have described as a ‘double 
transition to independence and democracy’. Accompanying that transition has been a 
desperate push to reduce poverty through attempts to develop a conducive enabling 
environment for the private sector, including ‘a competent, productive and disciplined labour 
force’ (República Democrática de Timor-Leste (RDTL), 2011: 20). 
At the same time that they were seeking to grow the economy, Timor-Leste’s founders were 
deeply aware of the need to maintain legitimacy with Timorese citizens and with their 
international supporters, some of whom were concerned with ensuring the development of 
practices of employment relations that guaranteed adequate representation of employers’ and 
workers’ interests. These priorities were reflected in the initial blueprint for the industrial 
relations system laid out in the Labour Code of 2002, issued by the transitional authority 
within months of Timor-Leste’s formal declaration of independence. Turning that blueprint 
into reality has, however, been an entirely different question. With formal sector employment 
at around 10%, the reach of an industrial relations system predicated on a regulated waged 
relationship is necessarily limited. But even within the bounds of the formal sector, 
government officials acknowledge that they have struggled with implementation as a 
consequence of a lack of capacity not only within trade unions and employers’ associations, 
but also within their own institutions (Interview with Director General of SEPFOPE, July 
2015). In short, the Timorese state has struggled not so much with the pressures of balancing 
the logics of accumulation and legitimation (cf. Hyman, 2008) – though these pressures are 
present – but with cementing the building blocks of its new industrial relations system. 
As Hyman (2008: 274) implies in his discussion of countries trying to achieve ‘late late 
development’, industrial relations is necessarily a ‘marginal phenomenon’ in contexts where 
governments are concerned with external domination, state building, weak civil society and 
the tensions between modern and traditional economic sectors. In the case of Timor-Leste, 
the process of industrial relations institution building was driven largely by the United States 
and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). The country’s political leaders agreed to 
participate in that process, but made it clear that job creation, not industrial relations, was 
their priority (Interview with former director of the ILO Jakarta Office, August 2015). 
Although the government agency tasked with operationalising those institutions has made a 
sincere attempt to do so, employers’ lack of understanding and reluctance to engage has 
compounded the challenges of implementation and enforcement such that the ‘system’ exists 
largely in name only. 
Drawing on data collected in interviews with government officials, employer bodies and 
trade unionists in February 2013 and July 2015 as well as discussions with representatives of 
the ILO, Trade Union Solidarity Support Organisations (SSOs) and a number of Global 
Union Federations (GUFs) between 2012 and 2015, this first account of Timor-Leste’s 
formal system of industrial relations examines the role of the state and international actors in 
its making and operation within the context of Timor-Leste’s emerging statehood. It begins 
with a discussion of the political and economic context in which the industrial relations 
system emerged before describing the architecture of the system and analysing its articulation 
with the practice of employment relations. 
Industrial relations in context  
In 2002, Timor-Leste emerged from a long period of colonisation first by Portugal, which 
controlled the territory from the mid-16th century to 1975, and then by Indonesia, which 
occupied it from 1975 to 1999. Although the United Nations (UN) held full legislative and 
executive authority until May 2002, the ‘Timorisation’ of the administration commenced in 
December 1999 with the establishment of a National Consultative Council (Gunn and Huang, 
2006: 93–94).1 Government structures were subsequently established over a decade of slow, 
often faltering, transition to Timorese rule under the watchful eye of the UN. Successive UN 
missions brought a great many resources to Timor-Leste but did little to support the 
establishment of a sustainable economy. Although some very well-paid job opportunities 
were created for the highly educated, and for workers in the service sector, most UN work 
was ‘done by foreign workers for foreign companies using foreign supplies’ (Gunn and 
Huang, 2006: 91). This dual economy was propped up by an aid bubble created by an influx 
of donor funds, which peaked in 2002 then tailed off as international staff left (Hughes, 
2009). The effect was immediate: growth in GDP fell from 16.4% in 2001 to –6.6% in the 
following year, only returning to positive figures in 2004 (World Bank, 2015). 
Rising economic inequality associated with Timor-Leste’s growing pains soon tested social 
cohesion. Tensions came to a head in 2006 when a dispute within the military escalated into a 
broader communal conflict in which hundreds of thousands of East Timorese were displaced, 
and the economy again ground to a virtual halt. While its causes were complex, demographic 
pressures including rural to urban migration and high levels of unemployment were 
contributing factors (Dibley, 2014). As a consequence, economic policy was a key political 
battleground in the 2007 elections. During the campaign, the Revolutionary Front for an 
Independent East Timor (Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, FRETILIN) 
focused on Timor’s right to use its oil revenues for economic development, while the 
National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction (Conselho Nacional de Reconstrução de 
Timor (CNRT)), led by Xanana Gusmão, emphasised the need for foreign investment, 
support for business and employment generation (Leach and Kingsbury, 2013; Molnar, 
2010). While FRETILIN polled most strongly, CNRT formed a governing coalition with the 
Timorese Social Democratic Association–Social Democratic Party and the Democratic Party. 
The new government made cuts to a range of taxes in an attempt to attract foreign 
investment, and shifted its emphasis from autonomous agriculture towards export-oriented 
cropping in 2008 (Anderson, 2013). The situation began to improve, driven almost entirely 
by government spending, which more than tripled between 2007 and 2011 (Sugden, 2012). 
This public expenditure was financed primarily by the petroleum fund, established in 2005 to 
manage revenue from the oil and gas industry, which had a balance of US$41.952bn at the 
end of 2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2014). 
These measures made few inroads in terms of broadening economic opportunities for poorer 
East Timorese. According to the International Crisis Group (2013: 34), youth unemployment 
and social inequality remain the ‘two most dangerous potential triggers’ for renewed conflict. 
For the government, then, the generation of good quality jobs is not just an abstract goal, but 
a necessity. A key element of the country’s Strategic Development Plan is its focus on the 
expansion of waged work, particularly in tourism and other service industries, complemented 
by the development of agribusiness and light industries in food processing, garments, 
handicrafts and furniture making (RDTL, 2011: 106, 201). This expansion is to be 
underpinned by growth in the private sector in both rural and urban settings, driven by local 
and foreign investment, and the development of an increasingly educated and skilled 
workforce (RDTL, 2011: 201). As the Strategic Development Plan also notes, the 
achievement of its goals requires ‘certainty and predictability in employee– employer 
relationships’, to be provided through the national Labour Law (RDTL, 2011: 152). In other 
words, labour market development and labour regulation have been positioned as part of a 
broader national strategy of accumulation. 
Establishing an industrial relations system  
During the Indonesian Occupation, the territory then known as Timor Timur was nominally 
integrated into the prevailing national industrial relations system, which carried all the 
hallmarks of authoritarian corporatism (Ford, 1999; Hadiz, 1997). East Timor’s lack of an 
industrial base and the military’s tight hold over the province made any kind independent 
representation of labour’s interests in the workplace or in policy-making even less likely than 
elsewhere in the archipelago, with the possible exception of the other separatist provinces of 
Aceh and Papua. As the East Timorese referendum for independence coincided with the first 
year of Indonesia’s democratic transition, the contemporary industrial relations systems of the 
two countries evolved independently. 
An important facet of this process in Timor-Leste – as, indeed, in Indonesia (Ford, 2009; 
Ford and Sirait, 2016) – has been the provision of financial and technical assistance by 
international bodies. The government has had access to technical support and financial aid, 
including support for industrial relations institution building from bilateral and multilateral 
donors. Moreover, although the ILO’s primary focus in Timor-Leste has been on vocational 
education and large development projects, ILO personnel were responsible for the drafting of 
the Labour Code issued in 2002 by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East 
Timor (UNTAET) and supported efforts to establish the institutions described within it 
through a project funded by the United States Department of Labor (Interview with former 
director of the ILO Jakarta Office, August 2015).2 The ILO subsequently facilitated tripartite 
negotiations around the revision of the Code, culminating in the enactment of Law No.4/2012 
(RDTL, 2012), as well as supporting the National Labour Council in the formulation of 
guidelines to assist with its interpretation (Interview with ILO Head of Mission, July 2013). 
Employers’ associations and the nascent labour movement have also benefited from 
significant and ongoing funding and technical support from their international counterparts, 
in the unions’ case from the international labour movement, but particularly from Union Aid 
Abroad–Australian People for Health, Education and Development Abroad (APHEDA), and 
in the case of employers, from bilateral and multilateral donors who have supported 
initiatives including the embedding of an international advisor in the Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (CCI-TL). 
The involvement of the ILO and other international organisations in the establishment of the 
industrial relations system played an important external legitimating function for the 
government. It has also left an indelible mark on the structures of industrial relations. It is not 
surprising, given the ILO’s involvement in the drafting of the 2002 Labour Code, that the 
regulatory framework of industrial relations in Timor-Leste reflects a strong commitment to 
tripartism. Similarly, the initial involvement of a number of GUFs, and the ongoing 
commitment of APHEDA and a Norwegian affiliate of the International Transport Federation 
(ITF), has very much influenced the form and function of the major trade unions within that 
regulatory framework. 
The regulatory framework  
The industrial relations system in Timor-Leste is predicated on the existence of employers’ 
associations, trade unions and a number of tripartite bodies. Under the 2002 Labour Code 
(UNTAET, 2002), trade unions were guaranteed the right to negotiate on behalf of workers 
involved in individual disputes and to engage in collective bargaining, and employers were 
required to provide access to a check-off system upon request. Conditions of work were also 
regulated. Discrimination on the basis of gender was outlawed and waged workers were 
guaranteed the right to a written contract of employment. Normal hours of work were set at 
44 hours per week and overtime regulated such that the total of normal and overtime hours 
did not exceed 12 hours per day. Annual leave was set at 12 days per annum, and provisions 
made for 12 weeks of maternity leave at two-thirds of standard rates of pay, with paid nursing 
breaks provided on resumption of work. Occupational health and safety (OHS) was to be 
dealt with under a separate regulation. 
Along with government officials, trade unions and employers’ associations were to be 
represented on a Minimum Wages Board, whose task was to set national, district and sectoral 
wages, and a Labour Relations Board, the focus of which was on dispute resolution. Parties 
engaged in a dispute arising during collective bargaining were required to engage in 
mediation and arbitration. Except in cases involving essential services, the parties could 
engage in strikes or lockouts on the provision of 10 days’ notice. If those negotiations failed, 
the case could be taken to the Labour Relations Board. Members of the Labour Relations 
Board and the Minimum Wages Board came together in a policy body called the National 
Labour Board, which was responsible for providing high-level advice on issues affecting 
employment and employment relations. Implementation proved, however, to be problematic, 
due to the Code’s lack of detail and the challenges of institution building (Interview with 
Director of Labour Relations, July 2015). 
Under the 2012 Labour Law, the Minimum Wages Board, the Labour Relations Board and 
the National Labour Board were replaced by the National Labour Council and the Labour 
Arbitration Council. The membership of the National Labour Board consists of three 
government officials and two representatives each from workers’ and employers’ 
organisations. Its task is to advise on policy and labour legislation and to propose a national 
minimum wage. The Labour Arbitration Council is composed of one representative each 
from government, labour and business. In addition, significantly more pro-worker provisions 
have been introduced including an explicit reference to employers’ obligation to engage in 
collective bargaining, a prohibition on lockouts, additional guaranteed rights for trade unions, 
more substantial provisions for leave, more safeguards against workplace discrimination, 
fully paid maternity leave and a 13-month salary bonus to be paid on or before 20 December 
each year. The revised Labour Law also incorporated guarantees of job security for 
permanent workers including a right to reinstatement in cases of unfair dismissal, except 
where the court deems it to be prejudicial to the company’s operations, and guarantees of 
ongoing employment in cases of a change of ownership, as well as provisions related to OHS, 
including compensation for accidents or death. As noted earlier, these changes were 
negotiated through a tripartite process in which trade unionists were better prepared than the 
employers’ associations, and the government officials were seeking legitimation both with 
Timorese citizens and with the ILO. 
Yet although the 2012 Labour Law is considerably more detailed than its precursor, it 
remains a very general document. The absence of Decree-Laws detailing processes means 
that many cases remain unresolved or are resolved in ways that are legally ambiguous 
(Interview with Director of the Labour Inspectorate, July 2015). As a consequence a large 
number of these end up in the civil court (Interview with labour lawyer, July 2015). In 
addition, however, the system’s efficacy is limited by the fragility of its institutions and a 
lack of capacity on the part of industrial relations actors, including the government agencies 
that represent the state. 
The state as an actor  
The state agency responsible for industrial relations is the Secretariat of State for Vocational 
Training and Employment (Secretaria de Estado Para a Política de Formação Profissional e 
Emprego (SEPFOPE)), which incorporates two major divisions, one of which deals with 
labour market management and planning, and the other with vocational education and 
employment. The Directorate for Labour Market Information sits within the Division of 
Management and Planning. The Division of Vocational Education and Employment 
incorporates four directorates, which deal with employment policy, vocational training, 
labour relations and inspections, respectively. This structure reflects SEPFOPE’s attempt to 
balance job creation and vocational training with its responsibility for industrial relations. 
Within industrial relations, the government aims to strengthen tripartism. SEPFOPE is ‘very 
focused on social dialogue’, and on educating workers and employers about their duties and 
rights (Interview with SEPFOPE Director General, July 2015). More broadly, the government 
has demonstrated its support for trade unions as a core actor within industrial relations. In 
2013, for example, the Minister for Agriculture and a number of Secretaries of State spoke at 
the Fourth Congress of the Timor-Leste Trade Union Confederation (Konfederasaun 
Sindikatu Timor-Leste (KSTL)) on 27–28 February (observation by author). Trade unionists 
and observers report, moreover, that the government, through SEPFOPE, has sought to 
actively involve unions in policy discussions (Interviews, February 2013; Interviews, July 
2015). For example, some 30 trade union recommendations were incorporated into the 2012 
Labour Law, where they participated more actively than employers (Interview with KSTL 
General Secretary, July 2015). KSTL is also an active participant in minimum wage setting 
through the National Labour Council. SEPFOPE has been less successful, however, in 
ensuring that the Labour Law is implemented. 
Employers and employers’ associations  
While the provisions set out in the Labour Law are designed to cover workers in both formal 
and informal sector occupations, they, in fact, apply to a tiny proportion of the working 
population. As of 2013, close to 24% of the 696,200 Timorese of working age were engaged 
exclusively in subsistence agriculture (Labour Force Survey (LFS), 2015). Just 213,000 
people – or 30% of working-age people – were active in the labour force. Of these, 45% were 
located in services, 40% in agriculture and just 12% in industry (LFS, 2015). Most were own 
account workers or contributing family workers. Although waged work has grown 
dramatically since 2001, just 41.6% of the 189,800 people economically active were in 
receipt of a wage or salary. Over half of these were employed in the public sector, while 
nonpetroleum producing businesses employed just 59,000 people, some 81.5% of whom were 
based in Dili (General Directorate of Statistics, 2014). Significantly, also, most private sector 
enterprises are small. According to a 2004 survey cited by Das and O’Keefe (2007: 12), over 
72% of formal enterprises have fewer than 10 employees, with a further 19% employing 
fewer than 20. A significant proportion of other waged workers were employed in the 
informal sector (LFS, 2015). 
When Timor-Leste joined the ILO in 2003, employers were formally represented by the 
Timor-Leste Employers’ Forum (Forum dos Empresarios de Timor-Leste (FETL)), which 
participated in negotiations on the revision of the labour law but was otherwise not 
particularly active on industrial relations matters (Interview with Director of Labour 
Relations, July 2015). FETL was dissolved once the CCI-TL was formed in 2011 (Interview 
with ILO Head of Mission, July 2015). Representing 19 member associations in different 
sectors of the economy, the CCI-TL is now the primary organisational face of employers. Its 
key objectives are to provide business services to its members and to advocate on their behalf 
with government on issues such as the need for support for the expansion of manufacturing 
and Timor-Leste’s stated goal of becoming part of the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). Although there is a discernible discourse among some segments of the 
local and foreign business communities – citing the minimum wage, but also problems with 
workforce behaviour and productivity – that the government is overly pro-worker, the CCI-
TL positions itself as the government’s partner in economic development (Interview with 
CCI-TL Executive Director, July 2015). 
Although CCI-TL has formally been in existence for a number of years, beyond participating 
in negotiations leading up to the revision of the Labour Law, it has been at best a peripheral 
actor in employment relations (Interview with SEPFOPE General Director, July 2015). 
According to its Executive Director, this has been the case because the organisation 
concentrated primarily on consolidating its membership and its internal processes, and on 
establishing a strong relationship with government. It is, however, now working to raise 
awareness of the Labour Law among its members as a first step towards deeper engagement 
with the industrial relations system’s forums and mechanisms (Interview, July 2015). Raising 
awareness of the Labour Law is vital since it is predominantly large foreign companies, many 
of them from Australia, that meet the requirements of the Labour Law. According to the 
President of the National Union of Small Enterprises, who represents CCI-TL on the National 
Labour Council, in most other cases employers only consider their legal obligations when 
disputes arise (Interview with UNAPE President, July 2015). 
This assessment of employer compliance with the Labour Law was confirmed by the Director 
General of SEPFOPE, who added that ‘Sometimes employers don’t even implement 
provisions that they have agreed to. For example, approved the payment of a thirteen-month 
wage during negotiations on the revision of the Labour Law, but now they don’t want to pay 
it’ (Interview, July 2015). The government has responded to these difficulties by attempting 
to raise awareness of employers’ obligations through media campaigns and other novel 
strategies; however, in the absence of better enforcement, responsibility for pushing for the 
implementation of the Labour Law has fallen very much on the trade unions (Interview with 
UNAPE President, July 2015). 
Trade unions  
Although Timor-Leste’s trade unions are more established than the CCI-TL, they, too, are 
very new. Independent Timor-Leste was effectively a greenfield site for trade union 
organisers (Interview with APHEDA representative, February 2013). There was effectively 
no labour movement – independent or otherwise – before Timor-Leste gained independence. 
The Indonesia’s Teachers Association, the Indonesian Nurses Association and the Indonesian 
Civil Servants’ Corps, all of which had been de-unionised under the New Order, had 
branches in Timor-Leste. The major alternative trade union of the late Suharto period also 
had a small presence. After independence, the number of registered trade unions peaked at 
12, but as of 2015 sat at eight, including the seven unions affiliated to KSTL (Interview with 
the Director of Labour Relations, July 2015). The eighth registered union is the Maubere 
Workers Front (Front Trabalhador Maubere), which is associated with a student group called 
the Maubere Front (Front Maubere) and has links with a leftist Indonesian union that grew 
out of the NGO-sponsored workers’ groups of the late Suharto period (Interview with 
Maubere Workers Front representative, February 2013). There is also a small union linked to 
the Timor-Leste Socialist Party, which in turn has links to the Indonesian Democratic 
People’s Party and Australia’s Democratic Socialist Party. Although not formally registered, 
the Director General of SEPFOPE acknowledges that the latter has ‘strong access’ to workers 
(Interview, July 2015). 
KSTL is the peak body representing the majority of trade unions. Its establishment was first 
mooted in 2000, when worker activists began collaborating with the Labour Advocacy 
Institute for East Timor (LAIFET), a labour NGO established the previous year to provide 
legal representation and other forms of advocacy for workers. LAIFET activists approached 
APHEDA for help to form a trade union (Interview with APHEDA representative, February 
2013; Interview with LAIFET activist, February 2013). The NGO was also instrumental in 
organising the first East Timor Workers’ Congress on 26–27 February 2001, where the 
resolution to form the KSTL was passed (La’o Hamutuk, 2001). Upon establishment, 
KSTL’s initial focus was on continuing the advocacy and organising work previously 
undertaken by LAIFET. Its second priority was to consolidate the public sector unions and its 
third to break into the private sector. Once the national tripartite committees were formed, 
KSTL represented worker interests on them. KSTL is robustly apolitical, though some in the 
leadership have open connections to FRETILIN, and leaders of some of its member unions 
have entered parliament (Interview with KSTL President, February 2013). 
KSTL acts as an umbrella for the Agricultural Union of Timor-Leste (Sindikatu Agrikultura 
Timor-Leste (SATL)); the Construction Workers Union of Timor-Leste (Sindikatu 
Trabalhadores Konstrusaun Timor-Leste (STKTL)); the General Workers Union of Timor-
Leste (Sindikatu Jeral Trabalhadores Timor-Leste (SJTL)); the Maritime, Energy and 
Transport Union of Timor-Leste (Sindikatu Maritima, Energia No Transporte Timor-Leste 
(SMETTL)); the Nurses Association of Timor-Leste (Associasaun Einfermeiro de Timor-
Leste (AETL)); the Public Service Union of Timor-Leste (Sindikatu da Funsaun Publika 
Timor-Leste (SFPTL)) and the Teachers Union of Timor-Leste (Sindikatu Professores Timor-
Leste (SPTL)). According to reported figures, these unions represent up to 8000 workers 
(ILO, 2014) or approximately 9% of waged workers in Timor-Leste. The number of dues-
paying members is, however, much lower, with KSTL’s public sector affiliates collecting no 
dues at all (Interview with KSTL General Secretary, July 2015). 
Although in principle all workers are governed by the 2012 Labour Law, public sector 
employees are subject to the provisions of separate laws and regulations, which have created 
uncertainty about the status of their unions (Interview with the Director of Labour Relations, 
July 2015). The only mention of trade unions in the Civil Service Code (Law No. 8/2004) 
appears in Article 115, which guarantees the right to membership of a trade union or 
equivalent organisation, the ‘establishment and functioning’ of which was to be regulated 
through a Decree-Law, which has yet to be released (RDTL, 2004). In the absence of this 
Decree-Law, complaints are dealt with by the Civil Service Commission established under 
Law No. 7/2009, which makes no reference whatsoever to unions. In practice, according to 
the General Secretary of SFPTL, civil servants appearing before the Commission may be 
accompanied by a union delegate, but its decisions are non-negotiable (RDTL, 2009). 
However, the lack of clear guidelines on the functions of public sector unions leaves civil 
servants in a vulnerable position (Interview, February 2013). 
A similar situation exists for the other public sector unions since teachers and nurses are also 
regulated under purpose-specific legislation. Decree-Law No. 14/2004 on the Practice of 
Health Professions makes specific mention of both professional associations and trade 
unions, noting that the former ‘may not carry out trade-union activities’. However, it is 
internally contradictory, as it also deems that health professionals appearing before the Health 
Professionals Disciplinary Board can only be represented by a professional association 
(RDTL, 2008). Decree-Law No. 23/2010 Approving the Statute of Careers for Child 
Educators and Teachers of Basic Secondary Education regulates the conditions of teachers’ 
employment, wages and working conditions, performance review and advancement within 
the profession, but makes no mention of associations or trade unions (RDTL, 2010). Given 
that close to 54% of waged workers – and a much higher percentage of those in secure jobs – 
are public sector employees (LFS, 2015), the sector represents a potentially important 
constituency for the nascent trade union movement. However, the lack of clarity described 
here – but also a lack of leadership internally, and in one case, prolonged elite-level conflict – 
has meant that while these unions continue to exist, and from time to time have engaged in 
some form of activity, they have failed to thrive. 
Although KSTL continues to acknowledge the importance of the public sector, the 
difficulties it has experienced in encouraging public sector workers to organise have 
prompted it to focus primarily on supporting its private sector affiliates in the short to 
medium term (Interview with KSTL General Secretary, July 2015). At the time of KSTL’s 
formation, the only private sector union in existence in Timor-Leste was the Construction 
Workers Union (Interview with STKTL General Secretary, February 2013). Construction is 
one of the largest providers of waged employment in Timor-Leste, employing 9500 waged 
workers in 2013 (LFS, 2015). As of June 2015, the union had approximately 700 members, 
567 of whom are registered as paying dues, a significant proportion of which is collected 
through an informal check-off system, where the money is deducted from workers’ wages by 
their employers and collected monthly by a union official (Interview with STKTL General 
Secretary, July 2015). The union tries to focus on larger companies, where it has greater 
bargaining power, such as road construction projects to the southwest and east of Dili. 
However, most members are employed in small enterprises. 
The second private sector union outside agriculture – the Agricultural Union is still formally 
affiliated with KSTL, but has been operating separately for some time – is the Maritime, 
Energy Workers and Transport Union, which was established in 2003. Most of the union’s 
members are in the offshore oil industry, employed by large multinationals like the Australian 
subsidiary of ConicoPhillips. Although in more recent years the union has since received 
most support from Industri Energi Norway, the Maritime Union of Australia (MUA) was 
initially heavily involved, paying for an Australian organiser to work full-time in Timor-
Leste. During that period a number of collective bargaining agreements were reached, 
including one with the Toll Group, then operating as Perkins Shipping, whose local director 
had been a member of the MUA in Australia (Interview with SMETTL General Secretary, 
February 2013). The union has a presence in 16 multinational and 17 local companies with a 
total of 888 members, although the number of members paying dues is considerably lower, at 
475 (Interview with SMETTL General Secretary, February 2013). 
The third private sector union is the General Workers Union, established in 2008. The 
General Workers Union has unionised a number of supermarkets and other retail 
establishments, hotels and bars, service providers in security and banking, and workers in the 
coffee industry (Interview with SJTL General Secretary, February 2013). As of June 2015, 
the union had a total membership of 3140 people, of whom 550 were registered as dues 
paying.3 Most of the union’s members are in retailing, primarily in small businesses with five 
or fewer workers. From 2015, the union has engaged more systematically in collective 
bargaining, signing four collective bargaining agreements with mid-sized retail outlets in the 
first half of the year. In smaller workplaces, its strategy is to negotiate the formulation of 
individual contracts so that they acknowledge the rights of the workers and role of the union 
in the employment relationship. According to the General Secretary, the bargaining push 
constitutes a significant shift in the union’s tactics from its previous focus on responding to 
worker complaints as they arose (Interview, July 2015). However, unlike the construction 
union, the General Workers Union has no access to a check-off system, even in the small 
number of larger workplaces where their members constitute a majority (Interview with SJTL 
General Secretary, July 2015). 
Industrial relations in practice  
Employers’ lack of understanding of their legal obligations, along with poor enforcement, is 
the principal feature of industrial relations practice within the narrow bounds of Timor-
Leste’s formal economy. These mutually reinforcing characteristics manifest in many ways. 
According to the Director of Labour Relations, the most pressing challenge facing SEPFOPE 
is the need to increase the implementation of the legal requirement that all waged workers 
have a written employment contract (Interview, July 2015). According to the 2013 Labour 
Force Survey, just 57% of employees – 74% of which are males and 26% females – have 
written contracts in place (LFS, 2015). This has implications not only for the achievement of 
legal guarantees concerning working conditions, but also makes it extremely difficult to 
prosecute cases in which the employer fails to fulfil his or her responsibilities (Interview with 
Director for Labour Relations, July 2015). Similar problems are evident in the 
implementation of the minimum wage and operationalisation of the right to bargain 
collectively. Although collective bargaining was explicitly recognised in both the 2002 
Labour Code and 2012 Labour Law, in practice it is the exception rather than the rule. Most 
employers are reluctant even to use the template designed by SEPFOPE, let alone engage in 
substantive bargaining. Likewise, although a minimum wage of US$115.00 was legislated in 
2012, many in waged employment earn below that level.4 Employers who fail to pay the 
minimum wage must pay compensation, but the provision is seldom enforced (Interview with 
Director of Labour Relations, July 2015). 
These difficulties with implementation are exacerbated by the under-resourcing of the Labour 
Inspectorate (Interview with the Director of the Labour Inspectorate, July 2015). As of July 
2015, the Inspectorate employed just 22 inspectors, 12 of whom are based in six of the 12 
districts outside Dili. The 10 inspectors based in Dili are responsible for the capital and the 
six districts where no inspectors are permanently based. As a consequence, many workplaces 
are seldom, if ever, inspected. In an absence of acculturation to the industrial relations regime 
set out in the Labour Law, inspectors have also found it difficult to gain traction with 
employers. In the early years of the Inspectorate’s operation, employers found to be in breach 
of the Labour Law ignored repeated summonses to SEPFOPE. In an attempt to increase 
awareness, inspectors travelled to the districts to explain the function of the Labour 
Inspectorate before initiating inspections. They also focused on educating employers through 
the issuing of warnings only in the first few years of operation, with sanctions enforced from 
2012 (Interview with Director of Labour Inspectorate, July 2015). 
In the absence of better enforcement, Timor-Leste has experienced relatively high levels of 
industrial unrest, much of it prompted by employers’ failure to meet legal requirements, 
particularly in dismissal cases. Between March 2001 and December 2014, 1924 industrial 
disputes were reported to SEPFOPE by KSTL. A number of these were larger cases 
involving strike action, such as a dispute with a Chinese construction company that was 
forcing workers to regularly work 12-hour days (Interview with STKTL General Secretary, 
July 2015); a dispute involving the Australian aviation company, Air North, which was 
requiring baggage handlers to unload charter flights without additional compensation 
(Interview with SMETTL General Secretary, February 2013); and a dispute with Bank 
Mandiri following the unfair dismissal of three senior employees (Interview with SJTL 
General Secretary, February 2013). Strike action has even occurred in the public sector, in the 
form of a two-week strike by the teachers’ union in the district of Baucau, demanding that 
honorary teachers be recruited as permanent staff and an end to discrimination against non-
Portuguese speaking teachers (Interview with SPTL General Secretary, February 2013). This 
campaign was unsuccessful; however, in the same year (2008), the union’s goal of securing 
separate wage scales for nurses and teachers was achieved through Decree-Law No. 23/2010 
(RDTL, 2010). 
Of the 1924 cases brought to SEPFOPE to December 2014, 85% were resolved through 
negotiations between the union and employer, 8% through conciliation or mediation. The 
remainder were dealt with by the Arbitration Board or the courts, or remain unresolved 
(unpublished KSTL data provided to the author, July 2015). While most cases continue to be 
resolved at the workplace level, use of mediation services has increased in recent years. In 
2013–2014, a total of 586 disputes involving 190 local and 396 foreign-owned companies 
and a total of 1351 workers were dealt with by SEPFOPE. The majority of these were 
resolved through mediation or conciliation, with a total of 46 being referred to arbitration 
(unpublished SEPFOPE data provided to the author, July 2015). SEPFOPE staff responsible 
for mediation have struggled with this load, both as a consequence of the lack of detailed 
legislative guidance and a lack of expertise in mediation (Interview with Director of Labour 
Relations, July 2015). Nevertheless, there appears to have been some growth in awareness of 
SEPFOPE’s role in dispute resolution, although serious concerns remain about the efficacy of 
their processes, with employers questioning the legitimacy of mediation, and both 
government informants and trade unionists identifying serious weaknesses in the arbitration 
system (Interviews, July 2015). 
Conclusion  
The experience of Timor-Leste offers insight into the difficulties of effective institution 
building, even in what may appear to be a relatively manageable context, given the size of 
Timor-Leste’s formal economy. As a newly independent country, Timor-Leste was always 
going to struggle with the challenge of increasing formal sector employment in the service 
sector and non-oil and -gas-related industries while at the same time building a skilled 
workforce and protecting workers’ rights; however, the government and its international 
allies had an important opportunity to establish best-practice industrial relations institutions 
in the tiny formal sector. The fact that the industrial relations system remains embryonic 
despite considerable international support is in part explained by the political and economic 
specificities of the colonial and post-independence experience of Timor-Leste. However, it is 
also testament to the complexities of building robust institutional actors and industrial 
relations mechanisms in an environment where there is no history of a functioning formal 
system of industrial relations. 
The case of Timor-Leste also reveals the dilemmas faced by state agents concerned both with 
accumulation and legitimation (Hyman, 2008). In the absence of a functioning labour market, 
the Timorese state is not concerned so much with the pacification of organised labour as with 
finding a way to encourage sustainable forms of accumulation (and the employment 
opportunities that accompany them) as a way of maintaining the broader peace. From the 
perspective of the state, the biggest risk to this enterprise is not the form of the industrial 
relations system laid out in the Labour Law, nor employers’ protestations that the law is 
overly skewed towards the interests of labour. Rather, it is the challenges presented by 
implementation, in part caused by a failure to secure employer buy-in even among relatively 
large-scale enterprises in the formal sector, and in part caused by the marginal status of 
industrial relations in ‘late late’ developing Timor-Leste. 
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Notes 
1 Timor-Leste officially became independent on 20 May 2002, but it was not until 20 May 2004 that the 
Timorese authorities assumed full responsibility for operational matters (Molnar, 2010). 
2 The ILO has organised training on topics such as freedom of association, organising, collective bargaining and 
service provision. In 2013, it also supported a joint initiative by the unions and the government to train police 
officers, who had been arresting workers engaged in legal strike action (Interviews with ILO Head of Mission, 
February 2013 and July 2015).  
3 The General Secretary acknowledges that he does not remove the details of former members from the register, 
thus the first figure is clearly inflated (Interview, July 2015). 
4As of 2013, average wages were highest in mining and quarrying, at US$1427.50 per month, and lowest in 
hospitality at US$186.60 per month. The Labour Force Survey records an average wage of US$80.00 per month 
for real estate, but this represents a miniscule proportion of the workforce (LFS, 2015: 113, 131). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
